Earlier analysis of unanticipated money growth is extended to output (GNP) and the price level (GNP deflator) for recent U.S. experience. Price level determination is more complicated than output determination, because both anticipated and unanticipated money movements are involved. Empirical results accord well with the model-notably, they support the key hypothesis of a one-to-one, contemporaneous link between anticipated money and the price level. Precise estimates are obtained for the lagged responses of output and prices to unanticipated money movements. Cross-equation comparisons indicate that the price response to unanticipated money movements has a longer lag than the output response. A form of lagged adjustment in money demand can account for this difference. The forecasts for inflation average 5.5 percent per year for 1977-80.
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Empirically, the contemporaneous and three annual lag values of DMR turn out to be important for explaining output. The persisting output effect of monetary shocks implied by the inclusion of lagged values of the DMR variable can be rationalized from the impact of shocks on stock variables, such as stocks of productive capital (Lucas 1975) , which are carried forward into future periods. An analogous argument, based on adjustment costs for changes in labor input, is developed in Sargent (1977) . In addition to monetary influences, the output equation includes a time-trend variable-intended to capture the secular movement of "normal" output and the military-personnel (draft-pressure) variable, MIL (tabulated in table 2), that was included in my previous study of unemployment.2 In that study (pp. 106-7) the military variable was viewed as measuring the incentive, operating through differential probabilities of being conscripted into the military, for avoiding the status "unemployed." For example, the incentive to stay in school or to take a job rather than be unemployed was viewed as a response to the military draft-partly reflected in reduced labor-force participation rates and partly in higher employment rates of labor-market participants-that would show up as a corresponding reduction in unemployment rates. Subsequent analysis that I have carried out on unemployment rates stratified by sex and age (to be reported) indicates that the response to the military variable is concentrated in younger males, which supports the interpretation of this variable as a draft-pressure effect on labor supply rather than an aggregate demand effect. With respect to output, the military variable would be expected to operate positively only through the induced employment response, since the effects that involve a disincentive to labor-force participation would operate inversely on output.3 Hence the argument for including the military variable as an expansionary element is less persuasive in the case of output than in the case of the unemployment rate.
The form of the output equation is log (yt) = ao + a1DMR, + a2DMR,-1 + a3DMR,-2 + a4DMR,-3 + a5MIL, + a6t + UV, (2) where y is real GNP in 1972 dollars and ut is a stochastic term with the usual properties.
2 A contemporaneous or lagged value of a terms-of-trade variable is insignificant when added to the output equation. The MIL variable is defined as the ratio of military personnel to the male population aged 15-44 for years in which a selective draft was in operation. The variable takes on a zero value at other times (parts of 1947-48 and 1970-76). See n. 4 below on the effect of removing the distinction between years that do and do not have a selective draft. A minimum-wage-rate variable, which appeared in my previous analysis of unemployment, is insignificant when added to the output equation. 3 To the extent that draftees receive lower wages than they would in alternative civilian occupations, there would be an additional negative effect of the military variable on measured GNP. As in the earlier case for unemployment, the output equation indicates a strong expansionary effect of current and lagged values of unanticipated money growth. The main difference from the unemployment results (Barro 1977a, p. 108 an updated version of the unemployment-rate equation is similar in this respect) is that the pattern of lagged output response to DMR shows a relatively greater weight on the contemporaneous value. (Also, the DMRt-3 variable, which was insignificant in the case of the unemployment rate, seems to have a weak positive effect on output.) As before, the most important expansionary effect of unanticipated money growth appears in the 1-year lag value, DMR, 1 The sum of the four DMR coefficients for output, 3.0, implies that a money shock of DMR 1 percent per year that persisted over a 4-year period (which would be a very unusual pattern of persistence, because the anticipated value, DMO, makes use of lagged observations on actual money growth) would raise output by about 3.0 percent. Since the corresponding estimated effect on the unemployment rate (starting from a value for U of 5 percent) was a reduction by somewhat more than 1 percentage point, there is an implicit Okun's Law type of relation in which money-induced percentage increases in output and reductions in percentage points of the unemployment rate occur on about a three-to-one basis.
The estimated output effect of the military variable is surprisingly strong and significant, considering the discussion above of the role of this variable. In fact the estimated coefficient in equation (3) implies that militaryinduced percentage increases in output and reductions in percentage points of the unemployment rate occur on an almost three-to-one basis that is, along about the same estimated Okun's Law relation that applies to unanticipated money movements. It is possible that the militarypersonnel variable is proxying for effects other than the influence of draft pressure on labor supply. However, the variable does not seem to be merely a proxy for government expenditure, since real government pur-chases of goods and services (total government or federal alone) or of defense items are insignificant when added to equation (3), with the MIL variable remaining significant.4 Equation (3) also indicates an estimated trend rate of growth of real GNP of about 3.5 percent per year. Table 1 
where M is the nominal money stock, P is the price level (GNP deflator), X is a measure of real expenditure pertinent to money demand, r is a nominal interest rate (measured empirically by the Aaa corporate bond rate; see below), t is a time trend, and ? is a random term that is not necessarily independent of the stochastic term, u, in the output equation 
B. Estimated-Price Equation
Two problems with estimation of equation (7) are the endogeneity of (G/y) , through its dependence on y,, and the likely endogeneity of r,. 9 With respect to the G/y variable, I have made two modifications that yield essentially equivalent results. First, I have used G/3 as an instrument for G/y, where y is the value exp [log (y)] and log (y) is calculated from the estimated-output equation (3). Second, I have changed the specification of equation (7) by replacing G/y with log (G). This procedure and the previous one yield essentially the same statistical fit for the price equation and also yield similar estimates for the coefficients of the other variables. Since the estimated coefficient on the G/y variable in the first approach is readily interpreted in terms of the underlying model, I report only results in this form.
With respect to the interest-rate variable (the Aaa corporate bond rate), the estimation problem would derive from correlation with the error term of equation (7). (It can be noted that this estimation problem is equivalent to the familiar one of estimating the coefficient of a nominal interest rate as one of the right-hand variables in a money-demand function.) Since I
have not yet developed an analysis that relates the interest rate to exogenous variables such as money shocks, expected growth rates of money, 8 Equivalently, nominal income would be invariant with the DMRs (for given values of M, and r,) in this case. I treat nominal income throughout as a derivative concept, implied by the underlying values of output and the price level, rather than using the (odd, but popular) approach of determining nominal income first and then considering its breakdown between output and the price level.
9 The error terms of eqq. (7) and (2) would not generally be independent, although the correlation between e, (shifts in money demand) and ut (shifts in output) would also have to be taken into account. Surprisingly, it turns out that the estimated residuals from the two equations are not significantly correlated: the correlation is +0.15 for the residuals from eqq. (3) and (9). In general, a joint estimation of eqq. (7) and (2) could exploit any relation among the error terms, but the impact of this extension turns out to be negligible in the present case. and other factors, I have carried out estimation of the price equation with a lagged interest rate variable, r,-1, used as an instrument for r,.'0 The use of rt -I as an instrument would eliminate correlation between the interest-rate variable and the error term of equation (7) (thereby leading to consistent estimation at the expense of some lost efficiency) if the error term is itself serially uncorrelated. The estimation of the price equation might be improved by the development of an empirical model of interestrate determination (which I plan to work on). However, the main shortcoming of the present procedure may not be with estimation of the coefficients in equation (7) but, rather, with the lack of a full reduced-form description of the influence of money, etc., on the price level. The channels of monetary effects on prices that involve variations in the nominal interest rate are not observed when the interest-rate variable is held fixed separately, as in the present analysis.
Another possible problem with estimation of equation (7) would be correlation of the error in the money-growth equation that is, DMR with the errors in the money-demand or output equations. The first correlation could arise if the monetary authority is willing and able to "offset" shifts in money demand. The second correlation would appear if countercyclical monetary response operates with a shorter lag than that assumed in equation (1) 11 (The correlation with the contemporaneous output shock would also affect the estimate of the DMRt coefficient in the output equation [3] .) Although the present analysis does not deal with these problems, it seems that the most serious questions would arise about the estimate of the DMRt coefficient in equation (7). It also seems that correlation of the DMR variables with the error term in equation (7) would not prejudice the results toward acceptance of the null hypotheses that were set out above.
From some preliminary work, it became clear that the immediate postWorld War II observations on the price level were heavily influenced by a residual effect of the extensive wartime controls (see below for a formal analysis of this period). Accordingly, I concentrate the empirical analysis on price equations that are estimated over the 1948-76 period. It also turned out that two additional lagged values of the DMR variable, DMRt 4 and DMRt5, were significant when added to equation (7) (7) and (8) (tests of this proposition are carried out below), the hypothesis of a unit coefficient on log (Mt) can be viewed as a test for the absence of money illusion. In this sense this hypothesis may be regarded as being on a different level (less specific to the particular theory under test but essential for confidence in the other results) from the other propositions to be considered. Accordingly, table 3 provides estimates of price level equations in which the coefficient of log (Mt) is constrained to be exactly unity (which amounts to using the negative of the 12 The interest rate on prime commercial paper and the rate on savings and loan shares are insignificant when added to eqq. (8) or (9) below. (5) and (7) that the estimates imply a negative trend in the demand for money over the 1948-76 period of about 2.4 percent per year (assuming a unit income elasticity of money demand, b1: see below). It would be preferable to relate this trend to movements in variables that explicitly measure changes in financial structure or other forces, especially since the stability of the relation between money demand and time per se is doubtful. However, I have not made any progress along these lines.
As mentioned above, the estimated coefficient of the MIL variable is insignificant throughout (table 3, where 0 < 2 < 1, b1 is the elasticity of money demand with respect to permanent income, and b4 is the elasticity with respect to current temporary income.1 6 From the definitions above of log (y/) and log (yrT), equation (11) can be used to obtain a price equation that generalizes equation (7) Table 4 indicates the resulting time pattern of estimated values for DM, log (M), U, log (y), Dy (the growth rate of output), log (P), DP (the inflation rate), log (y) + log (P) (nominal GNP), and Dy + DP (the growth rate of nominal GNP) all expressed as deviations from normal or trend values.
The positive money shock in year 0 produces an expansion that is concentrated in years 0-2 in terms of a higher level of output and a lower rate of unemployment and in year 0 in terms of a higher growth rate of output. The level of output is most of the way back toward normal by year 3 and completely back by year 4. By implication, the growth rate of output is below normal in years 2-4. The unemployment rate is back to its natural value by year 3.
The price level, which is raised slightly above its normal trend in year 0, actually falls below this trend for years 1 and 2. The price level moves above trend in year 3 and strongly above trend in years 4-6. Correspondingly, the inflation rate is above normal in year 0, well below normal in year 1, about normal in year 2, and well above normal in years 3-5. In the present example, the price level remains permanently above trend (corresponding to the permanent shift above trend in the money stock), but the inflation rate returns asymptotically to its normal value.
The last two columns of table 4 indicate the implications of the output and price level paths for the level and growth rate of nominal GNP. Nominal GNP rises strongly along with real GNP in year 0 but declines in years 1-3. Nominal GNP grows from year 4 on along with the increases in the price level.
The simulation illustrates the sense in which a temporary economic high 27 Clearly, endogenous movements of the nominal interest rate could be occurring, although the use of a long-term (Aaa corporate bond) rate makes the assumed constancy of r more plausible in the present example. 28 The pattern of DMR coefficients in this equation is -6.5DMR, -11.7DMR,1 -5.5DMR,. 2. The estimated natural unemployment rate for 1976 from this equation is 6.7 percent. A different viewpoint, exemplified by Taylor (1975) , is that unanticipated monetary changes can be engineered by the monetary authority in a systematic, presumably countercyclical manner. 29 This approach assumes, first, that individuals do not appreciate that the monetary authority is pursuing a policy of systematic deception (which could produce an unstable situation) and, second, that the private sector is in a reactive position vis-a-vis an activist, independent policymaker. Under these two conditions, the private sector is naturally viewed as adapting its expectations gradually (perhaps along Bayesian lines) to shifts in policy. An alternative perspective on policy is that it reflects the views of the private sector, as channeled through the political process, with respect to such basic issues as being on or off the gold standard, whether or not to establish a central monetary authority like the Federal Reserve, whether to pursue a "Full Employment Act" economic policy or a steady money-growth policy, etc. In this view the basic structure of monetary determination is likely to be stable over long periods (as I believe is true as a good approximation in the United States for the post-World War II period and is probably also true for the gold standard period from 1880 to 1914), although the process would be subject to infrequent, discrete changes. Examples of such changes for the United States would seem to be the return to gold in 1879, the establishment of the Federal Reserve in 1914, the changes in the role of gold during World War I and in 1933, and the passage of the Full Employment Act in 1946. It remains to be seen whether the recent heightening of attention to the amount and stability of the money-growth rate will pro-29 If unanticipated monetary changes can in fact be generated systematically through deceptive policy, it is unclear how such a policy could improve the performance of a wellfunctioning private economy. Clearly, some type of externality or transaction-cost argument would have to be invoked. The more likely outcome of unpredictable monetary policy is that it would exacerbate the information problems faced by private agents, as discussed in Barro (1976 , sec. 3) . In any case, a convincing normative theory of deceptive (countercyclical) monetary policy has not yet been developed. duce another change in basic policy. In any event, if these types of policy changes themselves reflect the workings of the political process or developments in the domestic or international economy, there is no reason to believe that the (average) expectation of changes in policy structure would lag behind the actual changes. Although a period surrounding a discrete change in policy structure might be marked by substantial uncertainty and difference of opinion, it seems just as likely that the average expectation would lead, rather than lag, the actual changes in policy.
VI. Extensions of the Research
The extension of the anticipated/unanticipated money concept to the determination of the price level fills an important gap in my earlier empirical analysis. Although the results on price level determination seem basically favorable to the approach, there are numerous issues that warrant further attention. The analysis brings out the role of the nominal interest rate in the determination of the price level. The research could be usefully extended to an explanation of the relation of interest rates to monetary and other variables. I am currently working on a theoretical investigation that relates the anticipated/unanticipated money viewpoint to interest-rate determination. This theoretical work will eventually be implemented empirically.
It would be important to extend the results obtained from recent observations in the United States to the longer time-series experience. This extension is both difficult and potentially fruitful, because it requires an explicit treatment of the types of substantial structural shifts in the money growth process (movements on or off the gold standard, establishment of the Federal Reserve, etc.) that were discussed in Part V above. The performance of the approach in this environment will be a major test of the usefulness of the anticipated/unanticipated money concept.
Finally, the present analysis does not detail the mechanism by which unanticipated movements in money affect real variables like output and unemployment. The precise channels are likely to involve unanticipated movements in the price level, which are the focus of theoretical models developed by Lucas (1973) , Barro (1976) , et al. However, the contemporaneous response of the GNP deflator to monetary shocks that has been isolated in the present empirical study may be too weak to provide the principal link between money and output. An extension of the analysis to additional "price" variables like the nominal wage and the wholesale price index and a consideration of producers' inventories may be important in clarifying the process by which monetary shocks translate into output responses. The analysis of interest rates, as discussed above, may also be important in this context.
